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Abstract
We develop a multi-agent communication model with participation decisions
to address the customer complaining behavior and the corresponding man-
agement policy. Privately informed customers choose among costly com-
plain, keep silence, and exit, and a rm decides complaining barriers and
whether to undertake a corrective action. It is shown that customers truth-
fully complain only under a moderate complaining barrier. The observed
low complaint/dissatisfaction ratio and costly complaint arise as one equi-
librium outcome. Customersexpectations, the precision of signals, and the
temptation of outside options are identied as the determinants of complaint
management policy. Firms are likely to set socially excessive complaining
barriers.
Key Words: Customer complaint management, Communication, Exit
JEL Classication: D82, L15, L51, M31
1 Introduction
Customers usually hold soft information valuable to companies, which are
often willing to hear the voice of clients to improve the quality of their prod-
ucts. Therefore, complaining from dissatised consumers is an indispensable
tool for companies to acquire information and retain the valuable customer
base.1 However, in practice it is observed that di¤erent levels of complaining
barriers are set by di¤erent companies. A concrete example might illustrate
this point. Ryanair, a highly successful low-cost airline in Europe, is notori-
ous in handling customer complaints: the only available complaining channel
is to write or fax to Ryanairs headquarter in Dublin, Ireland.2 However, the
leader in the North America low-cost airlines market, Southwest Airlines,
actively elicits feedbacks from customers3 to satisfy them.
Although it is well recognized that complaints provide company with
real-time monitoring,4 customer complaints are inherently private, hence,
subjective. This feature might make the acquisition and use of this informa-
tion costly for the rm. For instance, some factors leading to dissatisfaction
may hardly be the companys responsibilities, e.g., bad climate or tra¢ c jam,
or misperception among customers. Thus, a rm usually needs "su¢ cient"
information to justify costly corrective actions. Low complaining barriers
might invite customersexaggeration of dissatisfaction, but high complain-
ing barriers reduce the incentive to report to the rm. Similarly, passive
attitudes to the voice of customers might lead to failing to invest in the cor-
rective action, consequently the loss of customers. But it would turn out to
be much about nothing when the rm is very reactive to complaints but the
problem is minor.5 Hence, the rm has to balance the gain from retaining
customer base and the cost of corrective action.
In this paper, we formulate this tradeo¤based on the insight of Hirschmans
(1970) Exit-Voice theory. We develop a model of multi-person communica-
tion game that captures the salient features of complaining behavior, to un-
derstand these di¤erent complaints handling processes. In our model, there
1See Crask et al (1995), Barlow and Moller (2008).
2See http://www.ryanair.com/en/questions/contacting-customer-service
3Southwest has a well-designed online form to learn customers feedbacks
(https://www.southwest.com/cgi-bin/feedbackEntry), and provides postal address and
phone number for customers to express voices.
4For example, Crask et al (1995) summarize that the substantial variability and non-
durability of service quality make the feedback from customers almost the only criterion
to assess service quality. Fornell (2007) addresses the role of complaint in the customer-
company relationship.
5In terms of statistical decision theory, it is the type I versus type II error.
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is a rm who serves two customers.6 The rm ("she") announces a respon-
sive mechanism consisting of a decision rule specifying when to undertake a
corrective action as the response to customersactions, and a complaining
barrier. Each customer ("he") observes a private informative signal about
the true quality of the service, and independently chooses exit, complaining
or keeping silence. Quitters su¤er from an exogenous outside option that
is worse than the ex ante expected payo¤ from staying with the rm, com-
plainers need to overcome the complaining barrier, but it is costless to keep
silence. The non-exit customers become attached to the rm. After observ-
ing customersactions, the rm could invest in a corrective action to ensure
high quality. Then the attached customers perfectly observe the true quality.
They would be lock-in if the quality turns out to be good, and exit otherwise.
We rst analyze the mechanisms di¤ering only in decision rules. We focus
on two deterministic mechanisms7 which exhibit the features of the real-world
procedures: the passive and the reactive responsive mechanism, respectively.
While the former species that the investment is undertaken only when both
customers complain, the latter prescribes that even a single complaint su¢ ces
to convince the rm to undertake corrective actions. Depend on which mech-
anism is adopted, the nature of interaction among customers varies from a
coordination game (under passive mechanism) to an anti-coordination game
(under reactive mechanism).
Because customers might misreport their feelings, a modest complaining
barrier is essential for extracting truthful report. It is shown that the rms
optimality can only be attained by one equilibrium in the passive responsive
mechanism. However, due to the problem of multiple equilibrium in the
coordination game, it is possible that the rm adopts a suboptimal reactive
responsive mechanism. Under this mechanism, it is optimal for the rm to set
a higher complaining barrier; and the dissatised customers would complain
with some probabilities. This outcome is close to the real-world observation
that most dissatised consumers never complain to the business.
We further demonstrate that compared with the socially optimal com-
plaint management mechanism, rms are likely to set an excessive complain-
ing barrier. Moreover, we relate the rmschoices of responsive mechanism
6It also could be considered as two groups of isolated customers, like the passengers in
the bussiness class and those in the economy class. As regard to landing, ight time, etc.,
they get almost the same services. The key assumption is that there is no collective action
problem within each group, and no communication between groups is feasible.
7Two reasons stimulate us to focus on deterministic mechanism: rst, rms may not
be able to commit to a lottery over actions since the ex post optimal decision rule (when
the rm knows the action prole of customers) is deterministic. Second, in practice it is
di¢ cult to observe a random customer complaint management policy.
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to the customersprior expectation, the precision of signals, and the com-
petition pressure. For instance, in standardized industries, customers have
more precise signals about the true quality and the other customers signal,
this facilitates coordination between customers. Consequently, the rm will
reduce the complaining barrier and be passive to the voice of customers. Un-
der the severe competition, the rm is more likely to be reactive to the voice
of customers, but sets the higher complaining barrier, since the competitive
pressure increases the risk of losing the customer base.
Industrial Organization literature usually assumes that rms have private
information about the quality of products/services, and persuade customers
to buy. In practice, especially after purchase, the clients usually hold in-
formation about the real-time performance of products/services. Our work
takes this alternative direction and investigates the information ow from cus-
tomers to rms, consequently contributes to understanding the information
transmission within customer-company relationships. For the marketing re-
search, this work contributes by addressing some salient features of customer
complaints with a game-theoretic model, thus provides a strategic foundation
for the complaining behavior and management policy.
This paper is structured as the follows: Section 2 briey describes some
salient features of customer complaint behavior in real world, and reviews the
related literature. Section 3 lays out our model, and explores the benchmark
case that the rm is not responsive at all. Section 4 investigates the equi-
librium properties under the reactive and the passive responsive mechanism,
respectively. In Section 5 we compare the welfare under these two responsive
mechanisms, highlight some comparative statics, and discuss the robustness
of our results. Section 6 concludes and suggests the future research.
2 Background
In this section we rst present some salient features of complaint manage-
ment addressed by marketing researchers. These features to a large extent
are incorporated into our model. Then, we review the related literature in
economics, in particular, the works addressing strategic information trans-
mission.
2.1 Features of complaint management
As Fornell and Wernerfelt (1988) suggest, complaint management policies
typically apply to all customers, rather than a subset of clients; and they are
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closely related to the rms e¤orts on quality improvement. In other words,
the outcome of corrective actions, like the system upgrade, the reliability
improvement, reducing waiting time, and a better service attitude, is a public
good.8 Moreover, "e¤ort to facilitate voicing of complaints" is a crucial part
of the complaint management. It is widely recognized that the complaining
behavior is mainly driven by failing expectations, thus both expectations
and the realized quality are essential. These features motivate the basic
ingredients of our model, such as the corrective action as a public good, and
the strategic choice of complaining barriers.
The following salient facts about the complaining behavior are highlighted
in our work.
First, it is well-established that only a minority of dissatised customers
complain directly to the business, though the percentage varies by industries
and the type of problems (Best and Andreasen, 1977, TARP, 1986, Huppert,
2007). The classical marketing textbook by Kotler et al (1999) even asserts
that as much as 95% of dissatised customers never tell the company their
problems. This stylized fact suggests that keeping silence is more likely the
customers rational choice, rather than an abnormal action.
Second, since most customer complaints are unsolicited (Richins and Ver-
hage, 1985) and inherently subjective, the self-selection problem prevails.
Snellman and Vihtkari (2003) illustrate that the most frequent complain-
ers are those considering themselves guilty for the outcome. Doerpinghaus
(1991) suggests that the disappointed expectation, rather than the poor ser-
vice quality, results in complaints. It is also recognized that the complaint
frequency is not signicantly related to the dissatisfaction (Andreasen, 1977;
Bearden and Teel, 1983). Even worse, Halstead et al (1996) nd out that
the poor performance in one service area may predispose the complainers to
negatively evaluate and complain about other service areas or attributes.
Finally, clients might incur substantive costs to make formal complaints.
TARP (1979) identies the time and e¤ort involved, the ignorance about
how to complain, and the uncertainty about redress after complaints as the
primary sources of complaining costs. Moreover, the complaining behavior
and management policy vary considerably across countries, industries, and
companies. Many survey studies since Richins and Verhage (1985) have
established that the culture matters in customerswillingness to complain.
TARP (1986) demonstrates that the complaint/dissatisfaction ratio varies
signicantly across industries, where tourists and luxury products have a
8According to the monthly report from U.S. Department of Transportation, the most
common complaint problems are ight problems, boarding, customer services. The most
common complaints to Dell call centers are the long waiting time (Fornell, 2007).
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higher ratio, and consumer products have the lowest one. Fornell (2007)
identies hospitals, life insurances, airlines and health insurances as the worst
industries in handling complaints, while supermarkets and automobiles work
pretty well. And as our motivating example about Ryanair and Southwest
Airlines demonstrates, even the companies within the similar industry might
have quite di¤erent complaint handling procedures.
2.2 Related literature
Fornell and Wernerfelt (1987, 1988) provide a theory about the customer
complaining behavior on the basis of Exit-Voice paradigm a la Albert Hirschman
(1970). However, by assuming that a xed ratio of consumers will complain,
they preclude the strategic behavior of any individual client. There is a
large gap between economic theory and marketing research on the complaint
management. To the best of our knowledge, Prendergast (2002) is the only
game-theoretic work on customer complaining behavior. He considers the
complaint as a way to solve the agency problem, since the clients could g-
ure out the mistakes in the agents decision. Hence, the customer serves as
a monitor in the principal-agent relationship. His focus is on the possible
collusion between the self-interested customer and the agent. In this paper,
we take the divergence of interest between the customers and the rm as
given, and analyze the acquisition and use of information of rms.
Our paper links to the large body of research on strategic information
transmission originating from the seminal work by Crawford and Sobel (1982),
in which an informed strategic player wants to convince a decision maker by
sending costless messages. Kartik et al (2007) suggest that a sender would
exaggerate the true state to lie a naive decision maker. Two recent papers
exemplify the exaggeration incentive and the consequence in the context of
multiple senders. Morgan and Stoken (2008) study the information aggrega-
tion problem in the circumstance of poll. They show that the fully-revealing
equilibrium is impossible when the number of agents becomes large, since
the individual incentive to exaggerate also increases, and the decision maker
could not commit to a policy. Kawamura (2011) shows the impossibility of
fully-revealing equilibrium due to exaggeration incentives, and gives credit
to the binary message as a robust communication mode. Customer com-
plaints di¤er from the objects in these studies in that the action of customers,
e.g., whether to continue buying, really a¤ects the rms payo¤ even when
the communication is costless. Besides, we take the voluntary participation
problem into account, which distinguishes our work from all previous works,
with the possible exception of Ambrus and Egorov (2012). Moreover, in our
model the communication cost is also a decision variable chosenby the rm.
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3 Model
In this section, we rst describe the environment of our model, then we turn
to the denition of equilibrium, and impose several assumptions on para-
meters to restrict our attentions to the cases of the most interests. Finally,
we investigate the benchmark case in which the rm entirely ignores the
customersactions.
3.1 Model environment
There are one rm and two ex ante identical customers.9 There are two pe-
riods t = 1; 2, the possible quality of the service (true state) in each period is
t 2 fB;Gg, where G stands for the good and B denotes the bad. In the rst
period, each customer observes a private signal si 2 S = fB;Gg (i = 1; 2)
regarding 1. With a little abuse of terminology, si = B refers a bad signal,
while si = G represents a good signal. The signal is imperfectly informa-
tive in the sense that Pr (si = k j1 = k ) = q > 12 ; k 2 fG;Bg. We refer
the customer who get the signal G (B) as satised (dissatised) customer.10
Therefore, the signal space includes four possible events fBB;BG;GB;GGg,
corresponding to both get bad signals, one bad and one good signal, and two
good signals, respectively. Figure 1 summarizes the time structure.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
The timing of this game is as the follows: On the outset of the game
the rm announces a deterministic responsive rule g associating whether
to invest with the action prole of the customers, and a communication
cost D  0 imposed on every complainer. In period 1, Nature chooses
the true state 1, each customer observes the signal si, chooses action from
A = fE;C;Kg independently, where E;C;K denote exit, complain, and
keep silence, respectively. The non-exit customers become attached to the
rm and defer the realization of his payo¤ to the second period. Then the
rm observes the action of customers, and decides whether to invest in the
corrective action. At period 2 the true state is known to everyone, and the
attached customer chooses to be lock-in or exit.
In the rst period, complaint incurs the communication cost D. If the
customer exits in the rst period, he will get an outside option with payo¤
9In Section 5 we would discuss the consequence of asymmetric customers, e.g., value
customer v.s. new customer.
10As long as the rm is not perfectly informed about the true state, the value of com-
plaints from customers would not disappear.
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! 2 (0; 1), if he exits in the second period, the value of outside option shrinks
to zero.11 In the second period, all attached customers observe the true state
2 perfectly. If 2 = G, attached customers stay, realize payo¤ 1, and become
lock-in. Otherwise they exit and get 0.
All players share the common prior about the initial state of the world
Pr(1 = G) = 1   p, which has the natural interpretation as customer ex-
pectations or rms reputations. The rm could not observe the true state
as well as the signals of the customers. After observing the customersac-
tions, she could invest F to undertake a corrective action to ensure that the
true state is good, i.e., Pr(2 = G jF ) = 1. If no corrective action is un-
dertaken, the status quo remains and 2 = 1. To concentrate on the issue
of interest, it is assumed that the rms revenue relies exclusively on the
value of lock-in customer, V . Thus, maintaining customer base is crucial to
prot-maximization.12 Alternatively, the rst period could be interpreted as
the introductory phase, which generates negligible prots compared with the
revenue from consumersfuture purchase behavior.
We could concentrate on the rst period in which the customers strate-
gically use their information. We denote s i;si = Pr (s i jsi ) as customer is
perceived probability that the opponent receives s i, conditional on his own
signal si. For instance, GB stands for a dissatised customers estimating
probability that the other customer is satised. From now on we will use
the following notations to simplify our analysis. For a dissatised customer,
he prescribes u = Pr (1 = G jsi = s i = B ) = (1 p)(1 q)
2
pq2+(1 p)(1 q)2 if the event BB
occurs, and u = Pr (1 = G jsi 6= s i ) = 1   p if the event GB happens. A
satised customer expects u = Pr (1 = G jsi = s i = G) = (1 p)q2(1 p)q2+p(1 q)2 in
the event GG, and u in the event BG. Obviously, u > u > u, and the magni-
tude of this conditional probability is common knowledge among customers
and the rm. However, a customer has to infer both the likelihood of the
true state and the signal of the other side exclusively based on his own signal.
11This assumption reects the customersswitching cost: the longer a customer being
attached to a rm, the higher the switching cost entails if he leaves (Klemperer, 1995;
Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). This is made without loss of generality. We defer the
discussion about this assumption in Section 5.
12Its well-recognized among marketing researchers that keeping a current customer is
much cheaper, thus much more protable, than obtaining a new customer. According to
a o¢ cial report issued by U. S. government, the prot/cost ratio on average is as large as
5 to 1 (TARP, 1979).
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3.2 Decision rule and the equilibrium
The rm doesnt want to undertake too frequent investment in corrective
actions, so she has to make decisions based on customersactions. On the
other hand, her decision rule a¤ects customersincentive to report. To avoid
credibility problem, we impose the following condition about the corrective
cost to ensure that upon observing customersactions, the rm has incentives
to fulll her promise on the outset of the game.
To guarantee that the information of complaints is useful, we need to
impose several restrictions on the parameters. First, the valuable informa-
tion implies that ex ante, for the rm doing nothing dominates investment
in corrective actions, e.g., 2 (1  p)V  2V   F . Second, the value of in-
formation requires that the rm has some incentives to undertake corrective
actions. For instance, if she could perfectly observe the signals, then at
least in the worst event BB she would like to carry out the investment, e.g.,
2uV  2V   F . Thus, we get the following condition:
Condition 1 2pV  F  2 (1  u)V
A further implication of these conditions is that if the rm could perfectly
observe the customerssignals, her optimal investment policy is to invest only
in the event BB. However, since the rm could not observe the customers
private signals, she has to provide proper incentives to acquire information
from customers.
We restrict attentions to the monotonic decision rule g in the sense that
if the rm commits to invest upon a certain number of complaints, she has to
invest when more complaints are received. In literal words, if a single voice
convinces the rm to change, so do two voices or one voice plus one exit.
This rule also implies anonymity, i.e., the rm could not discriminate
among customers.13 If the participation constraint is satised under the
policy g, i.e., no customer exits, then the rms prot could be expressed as
g = [1  Pr (2 = B)]  2V   Pr (corrective action)F (1)
The rm aims to maximize the above prot function, subject to incentive
compatibility constraints and participation constraints of customers.
We further impose the following assumptions on the value of outside
options to make complaining behavior possible.
13If we allow the possibility of asymmetric customers, the basic result wont change since
the investment is a public good and every customer has only one piece of signal.
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Condition 2 The value of outside option ! satises the following assump-
tions:
1. !  u
2. !  u
3. !  1 D
The rst part implies that if the rm never responds and a customer
could observe all signals, he would quit if two bad signals occur. The second
part is the ex-ante participation constraint, which implies that if the prior
sustains, attached to the rm is a dominant strategy. The third part means
that if the customer expects that his complaint certainly induces a corrective
action, complaining dominates exit.14
The mechanism consists of a deterministic action rule g 2 fR;Pg15 and
a communication cost (complaining barrier) D 2 [0; 1]. R stands for the
reactive responsive mechanism, which species that the rm undertakes a
corrective action even only one complaint is received. P stands for the passive
responsive mechanism, in which two complaints or one exit are needed to
convince the rm to invest.16
Once the mechanism is announced and signals are drawn, the game be-
tween those two customers starts. A strategy used by the customer observing
signal s is  : S ! (A), which is a function mapping private signals into
the set of probability distribution over the action set A. The equilibrium is
formally dened as:
Denition 1 The Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium is a triple f(g; D); g such
that
1. Given the customersstrategy under any signal i(si), the decision rule
and the communication cost (g; D) maximizes the rms ex-ante ex-
pected prot in (1).
14This is quite analogous with the insights on network competition with quality di¤er-
ences. The key point there and here is similar: the formation of consumersexpectations
about the true state. "(T)his logic making expectations stubbornly unresponsive to price
or performance) would focus expectations on a rm that plainly could dramatically im-
prove its product if necessary- even if it never actually does so" (Farrell and Klemperer,
2007, P.2042)
15We have investigated other deterministic action rules and nd out either the games
between customers under these mechanisms can be generalized into these two rules, or
they are payo¤ dominated by these two.
16Wemay think that there may be randomly coming new customers in the second period,
thus the exit of old customer would not a¤ect the rms incentive to undertake corrective
actions.
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2. Given the responsive mechanism (g; D), for each player i and every
possible signal si, the behavioral strategy  (si) maximizes customer
i0s expected payo¤, that is, Eui
 
i ; 

 i jsi
  Eui  0i;  i jsi  ;8i 2
f1; 2g;80i:
3. The customersbelief about others signal (s i;si) is updated according
to the Bayesrule.
Since the rm chooses the decision rule before customers acting, her be-
lief after observing customers actions would not a¤ect any outcomes. A
customers action only depends on his own private signal, so we could con-
ne attentions to characterize the symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. We
say that when  is a one-to-one mapping from signals to actions, then it is a
separating equilibrium. The customers adopts a pooling strategy if all signals
induce the same action. An equilibrium is called partially revealing if in equi-
librium upon receiving at least one signal, the customer undertakes mixed
strategy, i.e.,  (si) = (C ; K ; E) where a  0 species the probability to
take at least two actions a 2 A.
Here we briey outline the approach. We rst propose the alternatives
of decision rules, then for a given decision rule, we examine the equilibrium
strategies of customers under di¤erent communication costs, and calculate
the prot of rms under each mechanism. Finally, we compare these mech-
anisms.
3.3 Benchmark case: No response
In this subsection, we analyze the benchmark case in which an obtuse rm
doesnt respond to the action of the customers at all. Thus, the status-quo
quality always sustains. We formally state the equilibrium in the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 If the rm never responds to the action of customers, then
C is unused in any equilibrium, and the equilibrium outcome depends on the
value of outside option.
1. If !  1
1  p
1 p
q
1 q
, then the pooling equilibrium emerges, every customer
keeps silence in the rst period, and the expected prot is:
Pooling = 2 (1  p)V (2)
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2. If ! > 1
1  p
1 p
q
1 q
, then in equilibrium the satised customer keeps quiet
and the dissatised one exits, the expected prot is:
Fully revealing =

p (1  q)2 + (1  p) q2 2uV+2q (1  q) (1  p)V = 2 (1  p) qV
(3)
Proof. See the Appendix.
In Part 2 of this proposition, since the rm wont respond to the action
of customer, a dissatised customer would not bother to complain, and he
leaves directly. Hence, her prot only depends on her expectation about the
events. The rst term in (3) represents the expected prot in the event GG,
which occurs with probability p (1  q)2 + (1  p) q2; the second term is the
expected prot in the event GB or BG, where only one customer becomes
lock-in.
Under the pooling equilibrium in Part 1, both customers choose to be
attached regardless of the private signal. Hence, the rm could not acquire
any information from customers. In the second period, both customers choose
to be lock-in if observing a good true state, and exit otherwise.
The result is consistent with the classic insight about market competition:
the more severe the competition (higher !), the lower the prot. Thus, (2)
generalizes the expected prot under the pooling equilibrium.:
4 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we investigate the equilibrium under two specic responsive
mechanisms. By Condition 1, we know that the optimality of the rm is at-
tained by carrying out investment only when two bad signals occur. Hence,
only the passive responsive mechanism with proper incentive compatibility
constraints could implement this. However, we show that this mechanism
fails to fully implement the optimal rule in that many undesirable equilibria
outcome might arise. Then, we move to investigate the reactive responsive
mechanism. We show that even though it could not implement the optimal-
ity, it always has a unique (symmetric) equilibrium, and the worst outcome is
avoided. Furthermore, for the rm it is optimal to induce the equilibrium in
which the dissatised customer randomizes between complaining and keep-
ing silence. This equilibrium outcome resembles the observation of the low
complaint/dissatisfaction ratio and the costly complaint. Finally, we analyze
the choice of responsive mechanism under the endogenous outside option,
11
in which the complaint management policy serves as a competitive device
to attract new customers and retain old customers. We nd out that the
suboptimal reactive responsive mechanism still emerges as one equilibrium
outcome.
4.1 Passive responsive mechanism (P ): coordination
game
We rst investigate the passive responsive decision rule, which implies that
the rm responds to either two voices or one exit or both.17 Under this
rule customer complaints are complementaries. If the dissatised customer
is pessimistic about the others action, he may exit rather than complain.
The rms optimality is undertaking the corrective action only when BB
occurs. The informative separating equilibrium CK, which prescribes action
C upon a bad signal and action K conditional on a good signal, could im-
plement this outcome. If the outside option is low, this equilibrium could be
attained by setting an intermediate level of communication cost under the
mechanism P .
This informative separating equilibrium requires that truth-telling is the
mutual best response. But since the passive responsive mechanism creates
a coordination problem between customers, multiplicity of equilibria arises
and many undesirable equilibrium outcome might emerge.
The minimal possible payo¤ to the action K is the expectation of the
good state if the rm does nothing: Pr ( = G jsi = B ) = BBu + GBu
= (1 p)(1 q)
(1 p)(1 q)+pq . Depending on the value of outside option, e.g., whether the
participation constraint in the rst period also holds, we could divide the
results of multiple equilibrium into two cases. Here we just present the main
results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Under the passive responsive mechanism, the equilibrium
varies with the level of communication cost and the outside option, for in-
stance:
1. If the outside option ! < (1 p)(1 q)
(1 p)(1 q)+pq , we have
17The response to exit may violate the interim incentive compatibility condition for the
rm, i.e., the rm may nd it is not optimal to invest if one customer has already quit.
However, adding this consideration would not alter our result signicantly, since it further
reduces the attractiveness of passive responsive mechanism in that the Pareto-inferior
equilibrium outcome becomes even worse.
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(a) If D 2
h
pq(1 q)
(1 p)q+p(1 q) ;
pq2
(1 p)(1 q)+pq
i
, then CK would be an equilib-
rium, and the rms expected prot would be the highest,18 P :
P = 
FR
P = 2V

1  p  1  q2  (1  p) (1  q)2 + pq2F (4)
(b) The pooling equilibrium KK, in which the customer always keeps
silence regardless of his own signal, is an equilibrium for any value
ofD. And it is the unique equilibrium ifD 2
h
pq2
(1 p)(1 q)+pq ; 1  !
i
.
And the rms prot is the same as (2).
(c) If D 2
h
0; p(1 q)
(1 p)q+p(1 q)
i
, the babbling equilibrium in which cus-
tomers always complain regardless of his own signal exists if The
rms prot becomes
bP = 2V   F (5)
(d) There is a mixed strategy equilibrium, in which a satised customer
keeps silence, and a dissatised customer randomizes between C
and K.
2. If the outside option !  (1 p)(1 q)
(1 p)(1 q)+pq , we have
(a) If D 2
h
0; p(1 q)
(1 p)q+p(1 q)
i
, there is an babbling equilibrium CC in
which customers always complain, and the rms prot is (5).
(b) If D  maxf p(1 q)
(1 p)q+p(1 q) ;
pq2
(1 p)(1 q)+pqg, the unique equilibrium is
a mixed-strategy equilibrium, in which a satised customer keeps
silence, and a dissatised customer randomizes between C and E.
(c) If D 2
h
p(1 q)
(1 p)q+p(1 q) ;minf (1 p)(1 q)+pq
2
(1 p)(1 q)+pq   !; pq
2
(1 p)(1 q)+pqg
i
, there
exists an informative separating equilibrium CK, and the rms
prot is (4).
(d) If D 2
h
p(1 q)
(1 p)q+p(1 q) ;
pq2
(1 p)(1 q)+pq
i
; there exists an equilibrium in
which a dissatised customer complains with the probability C,
exits with the probability E, and keeps silence with the comple-
mentary probability.
Proof. see the Appendix.
18In this equilibrium, dissatised customers always complain, and satised customers
always keep silence. Therefore, the rm undertakes corrective actions only when two
complaints are received, e.g., customers signals are both bad. This is actually the rms
best outcome. Hence, P is the highest among all possible mechanisms.
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If (1 p)(1 q)
(1 p)(1 q)+pq > !, e.g., the dissatised customer still maintains su¢ -
cient condence about the others signal (high q), or the outside option is
not too attractive (low !), E is strictly dominated by K. Then, only K and
C are involved in any equilibrium. It could be shown that the pooling equi-
librium KK always exists, since keeping silence is a mutual best response
of dissatised customers. If D is low, then in addition to the informative
separating equilibrium CK and the pooling equilibrium KK, the babbling
equilibrium CC also exists. This implies that if the communication cost is
low, customers might always complain regardless of his own signal. Besides,
there is a mixed-strategy equilibrium which species that satised customers
keep silence and dissatised customers randomize between complaining and
exit. The probability of complain, however, is increasing with respect to the
communication cost D.
Scholars may suggest to use the more sophisticate equilibrium selection
criterion to choose the plausible equilibrium. In this case, since exit becomes
the dominated strategy, the underlying game turns out to be a 2  2 coor-
dination game, we might use risk-dominance criterion (Harsanyi and Selten,
1987) to dene the cost interval where the separating equilibrium CK is a
more plausible prediction. However, when exit becomes possible, this equi-
librium selection criterion fails.
If (1 p)(1 q)
(1 p)(1 q)+pq  !, the participation constraint fails in the rst period.
Thus, a customer could review the outside opportunity after observing his
private signal. In this case, the babbling equilibrium CC still exists as long
as the communication cost D is low. Otherwise, a satised customer doesnt
bother to complain. However, if the communication cost is too high, or the
posterior is pessimistic, a dissatised customer may prefer exit to complain.
The mixed-strategy equilibrium in which he randomizes between exit and
keep silence hence becomes the unique equilibrium.
On the other hand, if D is not so high, then the situation becomes more
complicate. The informative separating strategy CK might exist for the in-
termediate range of communication costs. However, there also exists another
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium which is particularly bad for the rm: a
dissatised customer completely randomize over E;K;C. In this equilib-
rium, as the outside option becomes more appealing, a dissatised customer
is more likely to choose exit.
However, comparative statics exercises on complaining behavior ((13)
and (16)) demonstrate that the inclination of complaining increases with re-
spect to the complaining barrier (D), which is highly implausible, though
understoodable in terms of our model. Therefore, though the low com-
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plaint/dissatisfaction ratio can arise under the passive responsive mechanism
as an undesirable equilibrium, the direction of change would be opposite to
our observations. Hence, its di¢ cult to reconcile that this mechanism with
the management policy at work.
In summary, though the passive responsive mechanism with a moderate
communication cost could implement the rms best outcome, it su¤ers from
two drawbacks which may seriously limit its practical value. First, due to the
nature of coordination game between customers, the inevitable multiplicity
of equilibria arises, the undesirable equilibrium outcome may emerge. Second
and perhaps more important, when the outside option becomes appealing,
after receiving signals the customers participation constraint di¤ers from the
ex-ante one, thus it is more di¢ cult to retain customers.
4.2 Reactive responsive mechanism (R): one complaint
su¢ ces
The reactive responsive mechanism is characterized by that the voice of any
single consumer su¢ ces to convince the rm to invest. Under this mecha-
nism, the rm would commit to some ex post ine¢ cient action, e.g., invest
when only one complaint is received, even though her prior sustains. How-
ever, this mechanism also has two appealing properties compared with the
mechanism P . Since u (E) = ! < 1  D = u (C), exit is strictly dominated
in the rst period. Hence, the participation constraint always holds. Besides,
this mechanism ensures a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium for any com-
munication cost. Thus, this mechanism could fully implement this action
rule.
The point is that since one complaint certainly leads to a corrective action,
complainers substitute to each other. They have the incentive to free ride
the others complaining behavior. Thus, if they have full information about
signals and it turns out that the event BB occurs, the game between two
customers becomes a Chicken game, in which the only symmetric equilibrium
is a mixed-strategy equilibrium.
In the rst place, we explore the informative separating equilibrium. The
result is presented in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Under the mechanism R, CK is the unique informative separat-
ing equilibrium if and only if
p (1  q)2
p (1  q) + (1  p) q  D 
pq (1  q)
(1  p) (1  q) + pq (6)
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Proof. see the Appendix.
It is straightforward to calculate the expected prot to the rm
FRR = 2V

1  p (1  q)2  1  p (1  q)2   (1  p) q2F (7)
In this equilibrium, the rm loses the customer base if the true state is
bad but both customers get good signals (type I error). This probability is
p (1  q)2. Since a bad signal leads to complaints, consequently a corrective
action, the probability to invest is the same as the complaining rate (the
probability for the rm to receive a complaint), which is captured by the
bracket of the second term of (7).
By Condition 1, since the rm has to invest in the event GB and BG, this
fully revealing equilibrium under the mechanism R is not in the rms best
interest. Thus, we need to examine other equilibria under this responsive
rule. We characterize all symmetric equilibrium in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Under the mechanism R, the equilibrium varies with respect
to the communication cost D.
1. If D  11 p
p
1 q
q
+1
, the unique symmetric equilibrium is the pooling equi-
librium KK. The expected prot is the same as (2).
2. If D 2

1 q
1 p
p
1 q
q
+1
; 11 p
p
1 q
q
+1

, then in the unique symmetric equilibrium
a satised customer keeps silence, while a dissatised customer com-
plain with the probability
C =
(1 D) [(1  p) (1  q) + pq]  (1  p) (1  q)
pq2
And the rms expected prot is
PRR = [1 p (1  qC)2]2V f

(1  p) (1  q)2 + pq2C (2  C)+2q (1  q)CgF
(8)
3. If D 2 [ 1 q1 p
p
q
1 q+1
; 1 q1 p
p
1 q
q
+1
], then the unique symmetric equilibrium is
the fully-revealing equilibrium in which a satised customer keeps si-
lence, and a dissatised one complains. The expected prot equals to
(7).
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4. If D 2 (0; 1 q1 p
p
q
1 q+1
], the unique symmetric equilibrium is that a dissat-
ised customer complains, and a satised customer randomizes between
complaining and keeping silence.
5. If D = 0, the babbling equilibrium where everyone complains emerges
as the unique symmetric equilibrium, and the expected prot is the same
as (5).
Proof. see the Appendix.
It is noteworthy that the probability to complain, C , in Part 2 of this
proposition has the natural correspondence as the complaint/dissatisfaction
ratio in the business. The higher the complaining barrier, the lower this
ratio.
A surprising result is that provided with the reactive responsive mech-
anism, the prot-maximization rm always has the incentive to raise the
communication cost to induce the mixed strategy equilibrium described in
Part 2 of Proposition 3. This result is stated formally in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 4 Given the reactive decision rule, the prot-maximization rm
will set the communication cost at DR to induce the partially revealing equilib-
rium, in which a dissatised customer randomizes between complaining and
keeping silence. In which
DR = minf1 !;
pq
(1  p) (1  q) + pq
(1  q) (1  p) (1  q)2 + pq2   q2F
(1  p) (1  q)2 + pq2F   2pq2V g
(9)
Proof. see the Appendix.
Under the mechanism R, the rm in e¤ect commits to invest upon events
BB, BG andGB. But in the latter two events, the investment is ine¢ cient in
that rms belief concerning the true state remains the same. Therefore, the
rm would increase the complaining barrier to reduce the probability of in-
e¢ cient investment. Though under this mixed-strategy equilibrium the rm
might sometimes miss the real bad event BB which necessitates a corrective
action, this loss is compensated by lower wasteful investment in events BG
and BG (type II error). This could explain the well-established empirical
fact in marketing research that many dissatised clients never complain to
companies (TARP 1986, Kotler et al 1999). Our explanation is that the
observed low complaining tendency among dissatised consumers, and the
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stubborn complaint management policy like that in Ryanair, could be the
rms deliberate choice.
In summary, there are two perfect Bayesian equilibrium. One is that the
rm chooses the reactive responsive mechanism, and dissatised customers
play a mixed strategy. Alternatively, the rm chooses the passive responsive
mechanism, and the fully-revealing equilibrium among customers emerges.
Though the rms optimality can only be attained in the latter one, the for-
mer is more stable in the sense that the game between customers admits
a unique symmetric equilibrium. Thus, if a rm has pessimistic perception
about the coordination between customers, i.e., fears of losing customer base,
it is quite reasonable that she adopts the reactive mechanism. A rm has
to weigh the risk of losing customer base against the cost to incur ine¢ cient
corrective actions. Moreover, the mechanism R could provide a more plausi-
ble description of the observed low complaint/dissatisfaction ratio, hence it
is more likely to capture the management policy at work.
Figure 2 illustrates this comparison. For the sake of simplicity, we just
draw the pure strategy equilibrium under the mechanism P as the dash line.19
We could see that the pooling equilibrium (2) and the babbling equilibrium
(5) generate much lower prots, while the Pareto-optimal outcome is better
than the best outcome attainable in the mechanism R.20 In contrast, the
mechanism R always has a unique equilibrium. In practice, directly exit is
still rare as the initial response among dissatised customers,21 it again might
suggest that the mechanism R is in wide use in the real world.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Outside options might be another reason justifying the use of the mecha-
nism R. If the outside option is relatively high, there are equilibria in which
dissatised customers are very likely to quit. Thus, the rm may be inclined
to overreact and set higher complaining barriers. This suggests that the dif-
ference in the low-cost airlines market structure between Europe and North
America22 might contribute to the di¤erent complaint handling policies of
Ryanair and Southwest.
19The prot under the mixed-strategy equilibrium, by denition, will lie within the
region prescribed by pure strategy equilibria.
20By comparing (4) and (8), it is straightforward to show that when customersexpec-
tations become high and signals become more precise, i.e., p ! 0 and q ! 1, the prot
di¤erence between these two outcomes vanishes.
21Voorhees et al (2006) found that among those consumers who did not complain, only
6.12% explicitly mention brand switching as his action as the response to dissatisfaction.
22There are only nine low-cost airlines in USA market
(http://www.discountairfares.com/lcostusa.htm). On the other
18
To gain more impression on the relative performance of these two mech-
anisms, we construct the following numerical example:
Example 1 Let p = 0:5; q = 0:8; V = 1; F = 1:1; !  0:5. Its easy to check
that these parameters satisfy condition 1 and 2. Then, under the mecha-
nism R, the optimal communication cost is set at DR = 0:198; the com-
plaint/dissatisfaction ratio would be C = 0:94, and the prot is 

R = 1:235:
The possible scenarios under the mechanism P is more complicate, and we
address only the best equilibrium and the worst equilibrium. The best equilib-
rium is the informative separating equilibrium where dissatised customers
always complain, which requires D 2 [0:16; 0:64] and generates a slightly
higher prot P = 1:266:(2.5% higher than 

R)
In the worst equilibrium, a dissatised customer randomizes among all ac-
tions. Within the exactly same communication cost interval D 2 [0:16; 0:64],
if ! < 0:2, then no exit occurs, but the dissatised one complains with
C 2 [0:25; 1]. If ! 2 [0:2; 0:5], then exit is possible, and in equilibrium
C 2 [0:25; 1], while E 2 [0; 0:43]. Obviously, the prot loss for the rm is
substantive under this worst equilibrium.
5 Implications
In this section we rst undertake the comparative statics to derive the testable
predictions about the complaint management policy in practice, then we ad-
dress the social welfare issue. Finally, we discuss the plausibility of our
assumptions.
5.1 Testable Predictions
Our model assumes a corrective action as a public good, treats dissatisfac-
tion as a unveriable variable, and concentrates on the case of two customers.
Therefore, it could not accommodate some other features of complaint man-
agement, including private compensation for the customers loss. However,
this model still could make some testable predictions about the complaint
management policy. Our model suggests that the observed di¤erence of cus-
tomer complaint management policy is driven by the multiplicity of equilib-
ria. If we interpret customersexpectations p as a rm-specic characteristic,
hand, over 100 low-fare airlines operate across Europe continent
(http://www.attitudetravel.com/lowcostairlines/europe/), and Ryanair faces the
challenges from the leading competitors such as Easyjet and Vueling. It may not
be coincidence that it is also di¢ cult to nd out how to complain on both Easyjet and
Vueling website.
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e.g., rms reputation of delivering high quality product/service, and the pre-
cision of signals q as an industry-specic characteristic, e.g., the variation in
quality, and the outside option ! as an indicator of market competition, then
we can shed lights on the choice of complaint handling procedures in the real
world.
Though carrying out comparative statics is risky when there are multiple
equilibria, we still could address some cases where one mechanism is more
plausible to be chosen, e.g., the limit case of parameters.
5.1.1 Standardized product industry
q, the precision of signals, is usually higher (resp, lower) in standardized
product industries (resp, service industries). Therefore, we could examine the
limit case that q ! 1 to account for standardized products. In this situation,
the merits of the reactive responsive mechanism almost disappear. However,
the drawbacks of the passive responsive mechanism vanish. Therefore, the
mechanism P is favored by the rms.
On the one hand, the communication cost interval to have a fully-revealing
equilibrium under the mechanism P , (??), expands to (0; 1). On the other
hand, under the mechanism R, the interval for the existence of a fully-
revealing equilibrium would disappear, and the mixed-strategy equilibrium
could occur for any D 2 (0; 1). Thats because in the rst period, a client
observing his private signal is almost sure about the true state, as well as the
others signal, the probability weight attached to the events of BG and GB
thus vanishes. Because under the mechanism R there is strategic substitution
among customers, in the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium a dissatised
customer would still randomize between complain and keep silence. Under
the mechanism P; however, there is strategic complementarity among cus-
tomers. If ! is not too large, as the literature in global games23 suggests,
precise signals lead to vanishing strategic uncertainties, consequently facili-
tate coordination among dissatised customers. Hence, within standardized
products industries, if the competition is not too severe, rms would like
to choose the passive responsive mechanism. Hence, a testable prediction is
that in the industries of standardized products, if a rm also has some extent
of monopoly power (lower outside option), the complaining barrier would be
lower, and the complaint/dissatisfaction ratio would be higher.
23See Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (2003) for references.
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5.1.2 Customer expectations
Because DR in (9) might lie in the interval of D that also admits the fully
revealing equilibrium under the mechanism P , it is di¢ cult to infer the mech-
anism choice by only observing the magnitude of complaining barriers. How-
ever, taking derivatives of D with respect to p reveals that the optimal D
under two mechanisms would move to di¤erent directions as a response to
the changes in customer expectations.
First, observe that DR is decreasing as long as customer expectations
decline. When a rm is more vulnerable to the loss of customer base, infor-
mation from clients becomes more valuable. However, under the mechanism
P , as (??) shows, the lower and upper bounds of D to guarantee the exis-
tence of truthful equilibrium, decrease by di¤erent speeds whenever customer
expectations raise, and coincide when p ! 0 (thus the fully-revealing equi-
librium disappears). This suggests that, other things being equal, the com-
plaining barrier among those rms with high customers expectations might
be clustered on two extremes. Some rms may be trapped into the par-
tially revealing equilibrium under the reactive responsive mechanism, while
the others may successfully induce customers coordination, and obtain the
fully-revealing equilibrium with the high complaint/dissatisfaction ratio and
the low complaining barrier.
The contrast between Ryanair and Southwest in handling customers com-
plaints exemplies the predicted divergence. Among all low fair airlines in
Europe, Ryanair has the reputation of on-time delivery due to her deliber-
ate selection of destination airports. Southwest also enjoy the reputation
of on-time delivery and high satisfaction among customers in North Amer-
ica market. However, Ryanair sets very a high complaining barrier while
Southwest is keen to the voices of clients.
5.2 Social welfare
Though we have demonstrated that undertaking a corrective action only in
signal event BB attains the rms optimality, a welfare-maximization reg-
ulator may have a di¤erent view. The distinction comes from two sources:
rst, since a rm could not entirely exploit the surplus, customers and rms
may have di¤erent valuation about values of customer base; second, rms fail
to internalize the complaining expenditure she imposes on the customers, so
this communication cost is a socially pure waste. Since the informative sep-
arating equilibrium is more socially desirable, the maximum social welfare
under the mechanism P is:
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W
0
P = 2

1  p  1  q2 (1  p) (1  q)2 + pq2F 2 q (1  q) + (1  p) (1  q)2 + pq2D0P
where D
0
P =
pq(1 q)
(1 p)q+p(1 q) is the minimal communication cost to imple-
ment the fully-revealing equilibrium.
On the other hand, the maximum welfare under the mechanism R is:
W
0
R = 2

1  p (1  q)2  1  p (1  q)2   (1  p) q2F
 2 q (1  q) + (1  p) (1  q)2 + pq2D0R
D
0
R =
1 q
1 p
p
q
1 q+1
has the similar interpretation as D
0
P :
In both W 0P and W
0
R, the rst term is the customersexpected payo¤,
the second term represents the rms expected investment, and the third
term measures the customersexpected spending on complaining. We ignore
the rms prot since we think the value of customer would not disappear
if customers quit from a specic rm. Instead, it just transfers to another
rm.24 Moreover, most debates about the consumer policy focus on consumer
welfare and ignore rmsprots.
We compare the welfare under these two mechanisms and nd out that
the welfare ranking actually depends on customer expectations p.
Proposition 5 There exists a threshold value of expectations p such that
the welfare-maximization regulator should assign the mechanism R to the rm
with p > p, and the mechanism P to the rm with p  p.
Proof. The di¤erence in welfare could be written as the following:
4W = W 0R W 0P = 2q (1  q) (2p  F ) 2

q (1  q) + (1  p) (1  q)2 + pq2 D0R  D0P
(10)
Since q > 1
2
; D
0
R   D0P = p(1 q)(1 2q)p(1 q)+(1 p)q < 0 always holds. Thus, the second
term of4W is always negative. As p! 0, 4W !  2q (1  q)F < 0, and as
p! 1, 4W ! 2q (1  q) (2  F )  2q (1  2q) > 0 by deduce Condition 1 to
the limit case. Since 4W is continuous with respect to p, by the Intermediate
Value Theorem, there is a p such that 4W (p) = 0:
24Taking into account the rms prot, however, wont alter our basic result on welfare
comparison.
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There are two e¤ects in welfare comparison. The rst is the surplus
change e¤ect. Mechanism R species investment in the events BG and GB,
which occur with the probability 2q (1  q), in addition to the event BB
specied under mechanism P . Hence, the rst term of (10) captures the
expected welfare change due to the changing decision rule. The complaining
barrier reduction e¤ect is shown in the second term of (10). This is always
non-positive since mechanism R could induce the fully-revealing equilibrium
with a lower communication cost. When expectations about the quality
are low (high p), the rst e¤ect would dominate since restoring customers
satisfaction is of priority, even at the expense of unnecessary investment. On
the other hand, if customer expectations are quite high (low p), regulator
doesnt need to request too frequent responses.25
This proposition suggests that from the view of social welfare, the reg-
ulation on customer complaint management also should vary across rms.
Moreover, there are two instruments available to a regulator: assigning re-
sponsive rule and regulating complaining barriers. As Proposition 3 shows,
rms wont choose the fully-revealing equilibrium given the mechanism R.
Thus, if only the responsive rule is under the oversight of a regulator, the rm
with low customer expectations would set an ine¢ ciently high complaining
barrier. Therefore, it is appropriate that the regulation intervention aims at
reducing complaining barriers. Our analysis also suggests that such regula-
tions are the most important in the context that customers dont have high
expectations of the quality.
This sheds light on the practice of legal intervention in complaint han-
dling procedures in Europe. Since 1990s, the legal development on customer
complaints in European countries focuses mainly on transferring the burden
of proof from complaining customers to the rm. The directive on product li-
ability and safety issued around 1990 required the rm to use accepted means
of defense to convince the court, otherwise she will be held liable (de Ruyter
and Brack, 1993). This e¤ort could be understood as e¤ectively reducing the
complaining cost on the customer side, which in general would enhance the
welfare as our model suggests.
5.3 Discussion
In this subsection, we briey discuss the robustness of our results. In other
words, we want to discuss whether our results signicantly change if we relax
25Our analysis ignores the possible implementation problem of the mechanism P . How-
ever, as Section 5.1.2 demonstrates, for the rms with high customer expectations, coor-
dination are more likely to succeed under the mechanism P . Hence, it is also desirable to
force rms to implement the passive responsive mechanism for these rms.
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some assumptions.
We have assumed that the outside option shrinks from ! in the rst period
to zero in the second period. A more realistic formulation is setting !0 < ! as
the available outside option in the period 2. Hence, customers may compare
!0 with the expected payo¤ to being attached. For instance, when the worst
event BB occurs and both keep silence, the payo¤ to a dissatised customer
would be maxf!0; ug. If !0 < u, this doesnt a¤ect the equilibrium behavior.
Otherwise, the actionK becomes even more attractive since customers would
lose little from waiting for the news and switching then. However, the basic
characterization of equilibrium behavior under these two mechanisms wont
change much.
It is presumed that a rm would commit to an announced responsive
mechanism. This might look unrealistic in that we rarely observe a specied
decision rule that automatically triggers a corrective action. If rms could
not commit, both mechanisms su¤er from the rms incentives to overrule
her promises. On the one hand, under the passive responsive mechanism the
rm might not undertake investment if one customer exits, since retaining
the remaining customer is not protable. Then, there exist an additional
pure strategy equilibrium in which dissatised customers exit for sure. On
the other hand, the reactive responsive mechanism is also not self-enforcing,
since investment is not the best response when only one customer complains.
When the outside option becomes endogenous, the lack of commitment might
further induce both rms to be reluctant to undertake corrective actions,
since in equilibrium they indeed "exchange" customers: though customers
ow from one to the other, the size of customer base for each rm remains.
Some readers may conjecture that the robustness of the reactive respon-
sive mechanism is an artifact of our two-customer specication. In the real
world, perhaps no rm would implement a global corrective action upon a
single complaint. Thus, the coordination problem among consumers might
always emerge. However, for the rm the basic trade-o¤ between losing the
customer base and the wasteful investment remains. An optimal decision rule
may require a high cuto¤ level of complaints, which will a¤ect an individual
customers incentive to report private signals. On the other hand, lowering
this threshold level increases the customerswillingness to voice, consequently
makes exit less appealing and the undesirable equilibrium outcome less likely,
on the expense of too frequent corrective action.
We have restricted attentions to the symmetric equilibrium, which allows
full implementation under the reactive responsive mechanism. If asymmetric
equilibrium is also considered in the reactive responsive mechanism, then
there are equilibria where one consumer may never complain, while the other
always complains conditional on a bad signal. The rm thus can only extract
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information from one customer. The ine¢ cient investment occurs only in
either the event BG or GB, but not both. The prot thus exceeds that under
the fully-revealing equilibrium, but whether it can attain R (19) depends on
the subtlety of environment. There is no clear ranking between the outcomes
of the possible asymmetric equilibria and the symmetric equilibrium. This
story may apply for the complaint management with asymmetric customers,
e.g., some customers are more valuable than the others, but it hardly works
in our motivating example of low-cost airlines, in which customer loyalty
programme is rarely used.
6 Conclusion
Despite the value of information in hands of customers, why rms in similar
industries end up in setting quite di¤erent customers feedback (complaints)
handling procedures? We use a game-theoretical model in which a rm needs
to acquire and use the private information of customers to address this ques-
tion. Our parsimonious model demonstrates the basic trade-o¤ between cus-
tomer base retention and unnecessary investment in corrective actions. The
observed low complaint/dissatisfaction ratio, as well as the costly complaint,
are shown as one equilibrium outcome. We assess the welfare implication and
suggest that to restore e¢ ciency, it is possible to use public intervention to
lower complaining barriers. We demonstrate that the rm chooses complain-
ing barriers and management policy as a response to customers expectations,
the precision of signals, and competition pressures.
Broadly, our model studies the interpretation of statistical results from
a sample consisting of strategically self-selected senders. One implication is
that the meaning of messages is context-specic and depends on the sub-
tlety about the incentive. For example, when complaining is too easy, like
the internet poll or the feedback for the service of online sellers, our model
predicts that the information content of these feedback diminishes, since the
clients who dislike it most have the strongest incentive to express, and even
exaggerate, their feelings.
The exogenous outside option plays an important role in determining the
equilibrium outcome under a specic mechanism. The reader might wonder
what will happen if the outside option is endogenously determined, e.g., from
the perspective of customers, the product/service o¤ered by a competitor
might be viewed as the outside option. In the previous working paper version
we have investigated the mechanism choice under duopoly competition. We
nd out that the main results and intuitions in the monopoly case sustains.
The reactive responsive mechanism still emerges as the rms choice under
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competition.
In practice, the customer may voice out his feeling through choices from
multiple categories, like Very dissatised, Dissatised, Normal, Satised,
Very satised. Allowing a ner partition of the message space to express
the feeling would not signicantly a¤ect our results. Neither misreport prob-
lem nor free-rider problem would be eliminated by a ner partition, and
the incentive to exaggerate remains. Kawamura (2011) provides a rationale
of binary choice ("Yes" and "No") as a robust communication mode in a
multiagent environment.
Most marketing research on complaining behavior highlights the case
study. Our model contributes by providing a strategic interaction model
to explain some salient features of customer complaints. It will be valuable
to examine the predictions of our model with a large dataset. However, this is
limited by the availability of reliable data. Though there are many attempts
to measure the customerssatisfaction across countries, industries and rms,
the measure about complaint resolve to a large extent is still in absence.
In the real world, complaints coexist with compliments, and a non-negligible
part of customer feedback is praises. In our model, introducing compliment
will not change the outcome, since it is predicted that a rational customer
would never praise. In the real world, compliments might be possible due to
at least two reasons. First, from the standpoint of consumers, the reciprocity
concern may motivate customers to praise. Second, from the perspective of
rms, in the context of sequential purchasing, she may strategically induce
compliments from early buyers to inuence later customers. In a word, the
rm may have the incentive to manipulate the word-of-mouth among clients,
especially in the internet community (Dellarocas, 2006). This interesting
direction awaits for future research.
A Collection of Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
First, since the rm is unresponsive to customers actions, complaining is
strictly dominated by keeping silence for any positive communication cost
D, regardless of signals.
With Condition 2, we have that a satised customer attaches and keeps
silence. Then, we turn to the dissatised customer, though he doesnt observe
the event, he is sure that the other customer, if gets a good signal, would do
nothing. Thus, if he chooses to exit, his payo¤ is a certain amount !: If he
decides to keep silence, then in the event BB he expects to get u, and his
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payo¤ is u if the event GB occurs. His expected payo¤ from action K thus
is
BBu+ GBu =
(1 p)(1 q)
(1 p)(1 q)+pq
His best response to his own signal thus relies on the attractiveness of
the outside option. A dissatised customer keeps silence if !  (1 p)(1 q)
(1 p)(1 q)+pq ,
and exits if !  (1 p)(1 q)
(1 p)(1 q)+pq :
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
A.2.1 Case I. (1 p)(1 q)
(1 p)(1 q)+pq > !
This arises when the outside option is too low to attract dissatised customers
even if the rm wont undertake investment, namely BBu+GBu > !, then
E is strictly dominated by K.
If sincerely reporting signals is an equilibrium, it has to be the mutual best
response for each customer. Hence, we need BGu+GGu  BG+GGu D
and BBu+GBu  BB+GBu D as incentive compatibility constraints of
the satised and dissatised customer, respectively. Namely, we must have
pq (1  q)
(1  p) q + p (1  q)  D 
pq2
(1  p) (1  q) + pq
Moreover, we also need the participation constraint holds after observ-
ing private signals. By Condition 2.1, !  u; thus exit is a strictly domi-
nated strategy for satised customers. For dissatised customers, participa-
tion constraint requires that BB + GBu   D  !, which is equivalent to
(1 p)(1 q)
(1 p)(1 q)+pq > !. The expected prot hence is (4). Since in the equilibrium
the rm would invest only if two customers truthfully complain about the
bad signal, her optimality is attained.
Then, if the communication costD is so high that the payo¤toK exceeds
C, i.e. BBu+ GBu  BB + GBu D, which turns out to be
D  pq
2
(1  p) (1  q) + pq (11)
Then we have the pooling equilibrium KK. The expected prot is the
same as (2). In e¤ect, if the other dissatised customer always keeps silence,
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it is also the best response for a customer to keep silence when receiving
a bad signal. Therefore, for any communication cost pooling could be one
equilibrium.
If the communication cost is not high, in addition to the informative
separating equilibrium CK and the pooling equilibrium KK, the babbling
equilibrium CC is also an equilibrium whenever BGu + GGu  1   D,
namely the satised customer also prefer C to K. The condition turns out
to be the follows:
D  p (1  q)
(1  p) q + p (1  q) (12)
In e¤ect, multiple pure strategy equilibria always exist for any commu-
nication cost. Besides, there is a mixed-strategy equilibrium which species
that satised customers keep silence and dissatised customers complain with
the probability C . Since in this equilibrium a dissatised customer is indif-
ferent between K and C, we have
BB (C + (1  C)u) + GBu D = BBu+ GBu
The left-hand term is the payo¤ to the action C. For a dissatised cus-
tomer, corrective actions are expected to be undertaken only in the worst
event BB and the other customer also complains, which occurs with proba-
bility BBC . Otherwise, in the event BB the dissatised customer gets u,
and in the event GB he gets u. The right-hand term is the payo¤ to the
action K. Thus, we have
C (B) =
(1  p) (1  q) + pq
pq2
D (13)
A.2.2 Case II. (1 p)(1 q)
(1 p)(1 q)+pq  !
Here the point is that the participation constraint fails in the rst period,
like Part 2 of Proposition 1. When a customer learns the private signal, he
could review the outside opportunity. Note that by Condition 2.2 and 2.3,
!  minfu; 1 Dg; so D  1
1+ 1 p
p
1 q
q
should always hold.
First, we note that the babbling equilibrium CC still exists as long as
(12) holds.
Second, if (12) is violated, a satised customer still keeps silence. Thus,
we turn to dissatised customers. Intuitively, if the communication cost is
high, or the updated belief about the true state is pessimistic, then a dissat-
ised customer may prefer exit to complain. The mixed-strategy equilibrium
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in which he randomizes between exit and silence thus becomes the unique
equilibrium. This situation happens if (11) still holds. To calculate the
probability, we need
BB (E + (1  E)u) + GBu = !
In the worst event BB, a corrective action is expected only if the other is
also dissatised and quit. Hence, in this mixed-strategy equilibrium we will
have  = (0; 1  E; E) ; where the exit probability is
E =
! [(1  p) (1  q) + pq]  (1  p) (1  q)
pq2
(14)
Third, if (11) also fails, then the situation becomes more complicate.
The informative separating strategy (CK) exists if BB+GBu D  ! also
holds, which means:
p (1  q)
(1  p) q + p (1  q)  D 
(1  p) (1  q) + pq2
(1  p) (1  q) + pq   !
However, this pure strategy equilibrium fails to be the unique one, and
there exists another mixed-strategy equilibrium which is particularly bad
for the rm: a dissatised customer completely randomizes over E;K;C
if p(1 q)
(1 p)q+p(1 q)  D  pq
2
(1 p)(1 q)+pq . Tedious calculation shows that the
equilibrium strategy thus is  (B) = (C ; K ; E), where
E =
! [(1  p) (1  q) + pq]  (1  p) (1  q)
pq2
(15)
K =
(1  p) (1  q) + pq2   (D + !) [(1  p) (1  q) + pq]
pq2
(16)
Comparative statics regarding (14) and (15) show that whenever E is a
part of mixed-strategy equilibrium, as ! becomes more appealing, dissatised
customers are more likely to choose E.
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
The informative separating strategy CK is an equilibrium strategy prole if
the incentive compatibility constraint for a satised customer BG+ GGu 
1 D and that for a dissatised customer BB + GBu  1 D are satised,
which implies (6). The uniqueness is straightforward.
On the other hand, if the second inequality of (6) holds, then complaining
becomes the dominated strategy for a dissatised customer since it induces
corrective actions for sure. If the rst inequality of (6) maintains, then a
satised customer doesnt bother to exaggerate the problem. Thus, there
exists a separating equilibrium of CK.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
When the incentive compatibility constraint for a dissatised customer to
sincerely report, namely the second inequality of (6), fails, then though a
satised customer still keeps silence, a dissatised one will randomize between
action K and C. Hence, the equilibrium strategy is the mixed strategy that
assigns positive probability on action prole KK and CK: The probability
to complain whenever having a bad signal is calculated by equalizing the
payo¤ to complain and that to keep silence:
BB (C + (1  C)u) + GBu = 1 D
The left hand is the payo¤ to keep silence and believe in that the other
customer, conditional on getting a bad signal, complain with the probability
C . The right hand is the sure payo¤ to complain. Thus, we have C =
(1 D)[(1 p)(1 q)+pq] (1 p)(1 q)
pq2
. This implies a partially revealing equilibrium.
The event GG occurs with the probability (1  p) q2+p (1  q)2, where no
customer complains. On the other hand, in the event BB complaint occurs
with the probability 1   (1  C)2 = C (2  C), and in GB (or BG) it
happens with the probability C . The complaining rate thus is the weighted
sum of these two events

(1  p) (1  q)2 + pq2C (2  C) + 2q (1  q)C :
Since the rm would invest based on a single complaint, the only possi-
bility that both customers quit is that the true state is bad, but no customer
complains, which happens with the probability
p

(1  q)2 + q2 (1  C)2 + 2q (1  q) (1  C)

= p (1  qC)2
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The expected prot thus is
PRR = [1 p (1  qC)2]2V f

(1  p) (1  q)2 + pq2C (2  C)+2q (1  q)CgF
Hence, we get Part 2 of this proposition.
In another extreme situation, if BBu+1Bu  1 D holds, K will be the
dominant strategy for a dissatised customer. Tedious algebra shows that
this implies D  pq
(1 p)(1 q)+pq , where both customers keep silence. Thus, we
get Part 1 of this proposition. We return to the pooling equilibrium in the
benchmark case presented in Proposition 1, the expected prot thus is the
same as (2).
Moreover, if the incentive compatibility condition for a satised customer
to keep silence fails, namely the communication cost is so small that the rst
inequality of (6) fails. Then, the unique symmetric equilibrium is that a
dissatised always complains, and a satised customer randomizes between
C and K. The rm would be misled by complaints and incur ine¢ ciently
high expenditure on frequent corrective actions. We have Part 4 of this
proposition. The expected prot thus is lower than that under the fully-
revealing equilibrium.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
First, we need to show that the partially revealing equilibrium can induce the
highest prot. Therefore, take derivative of (8) with respect to D, we need
@PRR
@D
D= 1 q1 p
p
1 q
q +1
> 0, which implies that increasing D above the threshold
level between the fully-revealing equilibrium and the mixed-strategy equi-
librium strictly raises prot. Note that @
PR
R
@D
=
@PRR
@C
@C
@D
, since @C
@D
< 0,
@PRR
@D
> 0 if and only if @
PR
R
@C
< 0. Because C ! 1 whenever D ! 1 q1 p
p
1 q
q
+1
,
@PRR
@C
jC=1 < 0, 2pV < F , which is exactly the statement in Condition 1.
Then we could derive the optimal level of communication cost D which
maximizes the rms prot. The rms objective could be described as max-
imizing (8), subject to the constraint derived from Condition 2: C 
![(1 p)(1 q)+pq] (1 p)(1 q)
pq2
. We have
DR = minf1 !;
pq
(1  p) (1  q) + pq
(1  q) (1  p) (1  q)2 + pq2   q2F
(1  p) (1  q)2 + pq2F   2pq2V g
(17)
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Consequently, the equilibrium complaint/dissatisfaction ratio is
C = min
8<:
[(1 p)(1 q)2+pq2+q(1 q)]F 2pqV
[(1 p)(1 q)2+pq2]F 2pq2V ;
![(1 p)(1 q)+pq] (1 p)(1 q)
pq2
9=; (18)
and the prot is
R = [1 p (1  qC)2]2V f

(1  p) (1  q)2 + pq2C (2  C)+2q (1  q)CgF
(19)
References
[1] Ambrus, Attila and Georgey Egorov (2012) Delegation and Nonmone-
tary Incentives, Working Paper, Duke University.
[2] Andreason, Alan R (1977) A Taxonomy of Consumer Satisfac-
tion/Dissatisfaction Measures, Journal of Consumer A¤airs, 11, 11-24.
[3] Barlow, Janelle. and Claus Moller (2008) A Complaint is a Gift: Recov-
ering Customer Loyalty When Things Go Wrong, San Francisco, CA:
Barrett-Koehler Publishers.
[4] Bearden, William O. and Jesse E, Teel. (1983) Selected Determinants
of Consumer Satisfaction and Complaint Reports, Journal of Marketing
Research, 20, 21-28.
[5] Best, Arthur. and Alan R. Andreasen (1977) Consumer Response to Un-
satisfactory Purchases: A Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing Com-
plaints, and Obtaining Redress, Law and Society Review, 11, 701-742.
[6] Bougie, R.; R. Pieters. and M. Zeelenberg (2003) Angry Customers dont
Come Back: They Get Back: The Experience and Behavioral Implica-
tions of Anger and Dissatisfaction in Services, Journal of the Academy
of Marketing Science, 31, 377-393.
[7] Carlsson, Hans. and Eric van Damme (1993) Global Games and Equi-
librium Selection, Econometrica, 61, 989-1018.
[8] Crask, Melvin.; Richard J. Fox. and Roy G. Stout (1995) Marketing
Research: Principles and Applications, Englewood Cli¤s, NJ: Prentice
Hall.
32
[9] Crawford, Vincent. and Joel Sobel (1982) Strategic Information Trans-
mission, Econometrica, 50, 1431-1451.
[10] de Ruyter, Ko. and Antoni Brack (1993) European Legal Developments
in Product Safety and Liability: The Role of Customer Complaint Man-
agement as a Defensive Marketing tool, International Journal of Re-
search in Marketing, 10, 153-164.
[11] Dellarocas, Chrysanthos (2006) Strategic Manipulation of Internet
Opinion Forums: Implications for Consumers and Firms, Management
Science, 52, 1577-1593.
[12] Doerpinghaus, Helen I. (1991) An Analysis of Complaint Data in the
Automobile Insurance Industry, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 58, 120-
127.
[13] Farrell Joseph. and Paul Klemperer (2007) Coordination and Lock-in:
Competition with Switching Costs and Network E¤ects, in M. Arm-
strong and R. Porter (ed). Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 3,
North-Holland, 1967-2072.
[14] Fornell, Claes (2007) The Satised Customer: Winners and Losers in
the Battle for Buyer Preference, New York, NY: Palgrave-McMillan.
[15] Fornell, Claes. and Birger Wernerfelt (1987) Defensive Marketing Strat-
egy by Customer Complaint Management, Journal of Marketing Re-
search, 34, 337-346.
[16]   (1988) A Model for Customer Complaint Management,Marketing
Science, 7, 287-298.
[17] Halstead, Diane.; Edward A. Morash and John Ozment (1996) Compar-
ing Objective Service Failures and Subjective Complaints: An Investi-
gation of Domino and Halo E¤ects, Journal of Business Research, 36,
107-115.
[18] Harsanyi, J. C. and Reinhard Selten (1988) A General Theory of Equi-
librium Selection in Games, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[19] Hirschman, Albert O (1970) Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to
decline in rms, organizations and states, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
[20] Huppertz, John W (2007) FirmsComplaint Handling Policies and Con-
sumer Complaint Voicing, Journal of Consumer Marketing, 24, 428-437.
33
[21] Kartik, Navin.; Marco Ottaviani and Francesco Squintani (2007)
Credulity, Lies, and Costly Talk, Journal of Economic Theory, 134,
93-116.
[22] Kawamura, Kohei (2011) A Model of Public Consultation: Why is Bi-
nary Communication So Common? Economic Journal, 121, 819-842.
[23] Klemperer, Paul (1995) Competition when Consumers have Switch-
ing Costs: An Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization,
Macroeconomics, and International Trade, Review of Economic Studies,
62, 515-539.
[24] Kotler, Philip.; Gary Armstrong.; John Saunders. and Veronica Wong
(1999) Principles of Marketing, London, UK: Prentice Hall Europe.
[25] Morgan, John. and Phillip C. Stocken (2007) Information Aggregation
in Polls, American Economic Review, 98, 864-869.
[26] Morris, Stephen. and Hyun Song Shin (2003) Global Games: Theory and
Applications, in Advances in Economics and Econometrics (Proceedings
of the Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society), edited by M.
Dewatripont, L. Hansen and S. Turnovsky; Cambridge University Press.
[27] Prendergast, Canice (2002) Consumers and Agency Problems, Economic
Journal, 112, C34-C51.
[28] Richins, Marsha. and Bronislaw J. Verhage. (1985) Cross-Cultural Dif-
ferences in Consumer Attitudes and their Implications for Complaint
Management, International Journal of Research in Marketing, 2, 197-
206.
[29] Singh, J (1988) Consumer Complaint Intentions and Behaviors: Deni-
tional and Taxonomical Issues, Journal of Marketing, 52, 93-107.
[30] Snellman, K. and T. Vihtkari (2003) Customer Complaining Behavior in
Technology-based Service Encounters, International Journal of Service
Industry Management, 14, 217-231.
[31] TARP (Technical Assistance Research Program) (1979) Consumer Com-
plaint Handling in America: An Update Study, Washington, DC: White
House O¢ ce of Consumer A¤airs.
[32]    (1986) TARPs Approach to Customer Driven Quality: Moving
from Measuring to Managing Customer Satisfaction, Washington DC:
White House O¢ ce of Consumer A¤airs.
34
[33] Voorhees, Clay M.; Michael K. Brady. and David M. Horowitz (2006) A
Voice from the Silent Masses: An Exploratory and Comparative Analy-
sis of Noncomplainers, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science,
34, 514-527.
35
  
Figure 1. Time structure of the game 
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Figure 2 The comparison of profits between two mechanisms 
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